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Introduction
Law and neuroscience seem strange bedfellows. But the engage-
ment of lawwith neuroscientific evidence was inevitable. For one
thing, the effectiveness of legal systems in regulating behavior and
meting out justice often depends on weighing evidence about
how and why a person behaved as he or she did. And these are
things that neuroscience can sometimes illuminate. For another,
lawyers are ethically bound to champion their clients’ interests.
So they remain alert for new, relevant, or potentially persuasive
information, such as neuroscience may at times offer, that could
help to explain or contextualize behavior of their clients.
In light of this, and in the wake of remarkable growth in and
visibility of neuroscientific research, a distinct field of Law &
Neuroscience (sometimes called “neurolaw”) has emerged in
barely a decade (Garland, 2004; Zeki and Goodenough, 2006;
Gazzaniga, 2008; Freeman and Goodenough, 2009; Mackintosh,
2011; Spranger, 2011; Davis, 2012; Jones and Shen, 2012; Morse
and Roskies, 2013; Jones et al., 2013a). Whether this engagement
is ultimately more for better or for worse (there will be both) will
depend in large measure on the effectiveness of transdisciplinary
partnerships between neuroscientists and legal scholars.How can
they best help the legal system to understand both the promise
and the perils of using neuroscientific evidence in legal proceed-
ings? And how can they help legal decision-makers draw only
legally and scientifically sound inferences about the relationships
between particular neuroscientific evidence and particular
behaviors?
In this article, we highlight some efforts to establish and ex-
pand such partnerships.We identify some of the key reasons why
neuroscience may be useful to law, providing examples along the
way. In doing so, we hope to further stimulate interdisciplinary
communication and collaborative research in this area. This ar-
ticle is not meant to be a comprehensive review but rather is
intended to highlight a Symposium at the 2013 Society for Neu-
roscience AnnualMeeting. (For amore thorough review, readers
are referred to Jones and Shen, 2012).
Lobes and robes: the intersection of neuroscience and law
Clear statistics are hard to find, but many indicators suggest that
courts are increasingly encountering offers of neuroscientific ev-
idence. Why? Among other reasons, many people in the legal
system hope that insights from neuroscience can help to answer
some of the hard and perennial questions law routinely faces.
These include questions, such as follows: Is this person responsi-
ble for his behavior? What was this person’s mental state at the
time of the act? How much capacity did this person have to act
differently? What are the effects of addiction, adolescence, or
advanced age on one’s capacity to control behavior? How com-
petent is this person? What does this person remember? How
accurate is this person’smemory?What are the effects of emotion
on memory, behavior, and motivation? Is this person telling the
truth?Howmuch pain is this person in?Howbadly injured is this
person’s brain?
Of course, the relevance of neuroscience to law depends inti-
mately on the specific legal issue and context. And neuroscientific
evidence is but one kind of evidence, to be weighed alongside
other kinds. But, speaking quite generally, neuroscientific evi-
dence might aid law in at least seven (sometimes overlapping)
ways (Jones, 2013):
1. Buttressing—by increasing juror confidence in a conclu-
sion to which other, non-neuroscientific evidence already
independently points (such as in the context of “dimin-
ished capacity” determinations);
2. Challenging—by calling into question or contradicting ei-
ther other evidence in a case or a relevant legal assumption
(such as those reflected in certain evidentiary rules);
3. Detecting—by identifying the existence of legally relevant
facts (such as injuries, lies, or pain);
4. Sorting—by separating people into useful categories (such
as those most likely to respond to drug rehabilitation);
5. Intervening—by providing new methods to achieve legal
goals (such as through pharmacological interventions that
would help to reduce recidivism);
6. Explaining—by illuminating decision pathways with in-
formation that may lead to more informed and less biased
decisions (such as in the context of third-party punishment
[TPP] decisions);
7. Predicting—by improving law’s ability to estimate proba-
bilities of future behavior (such as future violence).
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Some of these possible uses are speculative, more theoretical
than current. Others reflect cases already arising in both criminal
and civil contexts. For example, in the criminal caseUnited States
of America v. Lorne Allan Semrau, the defendant offered during
the liability phase of his trial fMRI evidence that purportedly
showed he did not actually intend to defraud the government.
That evidence was ultimately excluded (because of particular
weaknesses in the experimental protocol and a lack of the meth-
od’s acceptance in the relevant scientific community) (Wagner,
2010; Shen and Jones, 2011; Greely and Wagner, 2011). And in
Florida v. Grady Nelson, the defendant offered EEG evidence of
brain function abnormalities in an effort to avoid being sen-
tenced to death for themurder of which he’d been convicted. The
court admitted the evidence, and the defendant was by a narrow
margin sentenced instead to life in prison. Two jurors reported
afterward that the brain evidence made the difference in their
voting not to execute him (Miller, 2010). In civil cases, brain
evidence appears increasingly in, for instance, lawsuits involving
injuries to the head, including both tort actions and suits over
disability benefits.
Although cases such as the foregoing tend to encounter neu-
roscientific evidence that is specific to individuals before the
court, it is important to emphasize that the legal system some-
times encounters neuroscientific studies based on group data.
For example, neuroscientific approaches to defining death by
brain measures have been broadly influential. And in the recent
case, Miller v Alabama, the United States Supreme Court refer-
enced, in finding that mandatory sentences of life without the
possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders,
group-based brain science findings regarding impulse control,
planning ahead, and risk avoidance.
There are numerous other neurolaw developments, outside
of the litigation context, of which interested readers should be
aware. For example, the MacArthur Foundation has invested
over $15,000,000 in creating the Law and Neuroscience Proj-
ect (2007–11, headquartered at University of California, Santa
Barbara) and the Research Network on Law and Neuroscience
(2011–14, headquartered at Vanderbilt University) (www.
lawneuro.org) (Fig. 1). The principal mission has been to cre-
ate partnerships among neuroscientists, judges, and legal
scholars to: (1) guide the legal system in finding the promise of
neuroscientific insights among the perils of interpreting them;
and (2) conduct new, collaborative, interdisciplinary research
that may help to increase the fairness and effectiveness of the
criminal justice system.
In parallel to these developments, there has been a sharp rise in
both conceptual and empirical scholarship in neurolaw (Fig. 2),
conferences, international neurolaw societies, “law and neurosci-
ence” courses being taught in law and other departments inter-
nationally, and so on. The field has inspired new research and
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (www.lawneuro.org).
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training programs (such as those at Law and Neuroscience at
Vanderbilt University, Neuroscience and Public Policy at Uni-
versity ofWisconsin, Penn Neuroscience Boot Camp, and Initia-
tive on Neuroscience and the Law), and will see its first dedicated
coursebook in 2014 (Jones et al., 2013a). Moreover, there have
been a plethora of judicial training seminars (sponsored by the
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science, the Federal Judicial
Center, the Gruter Institute, and others), as well as an increase in
legal academics and professionals seeking short but immersive
training in neuroscience (most prominently at the University of
Pennsylvania Neuroscience Boot Camp).
These developments, and others like them, signal some of the
many potential applications of neuroscientific insights in legal
contexts, as the next three sections illustrate in more detail.
The neural basis of legal decision-making
Although much of the interest in neurolaw has focused on un-
derstanding the mind and brain of criminals, neuroscience can
also make important contributions with respect to jurors and
judges. For a fair and just legal system relies on the sound judg-
ment of these impartial third parties, as they decide the culpa-
bility of defendants and assign appropriate punishments.
Notwithstanding the often high stakes, legal decision-making is
prone to the same influences and vagaries as are other decision-
making processes. For example, the issue of race bias has plagued
the justice system, from racial profiling to contested court deci-
sions (as in the recent George Zimmerman case; Florida v. George
Zimmerman). Given that even factors as benign as the timing of a
parole decision relative to the decider’s lunch break can dramat-
ically influence outcomes (Danzinger et al., 2011), it seems clear
that developing a broader and deeper understanding of the neu-
ral mechanisms of legal decisions might ultimately aid efforts to
improve the fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice
system.
Fortunately, the initial foray of legal decision-making into the
neuroscientific realm can benefit from decades of research on the
neural bases of general decision-making, from single cells to sys-
tems (Gold and Shadlen, 2001; Schall, 2001), and from simple
sensory decisions in monkeys to complex decision processes in
humans (Lee, 2013). Even more pertinent is the work investigat-
ing the neuralmechanisms underlying second-party punishment
(‘I punish you for harmingme’) (Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch et al.,
2006). And, to the extent that TPP refers to an aversive reaction
to the violation of social norms, the emerging study of legal
decision-making overlaps substantially with the field of moral
neuroscience (Greene et al., 2001;Moll et al., 2005; Klieman et al.,
2008), save for the pivotal role that punishment decisions play in
the legal field.
Correspondingly, initial neuroimaging studies of TPP have
used paradigms similar to those used in the moral field. This
includes, for example, the presentation to subjects of scenarios
Figure 2. Cumulative total of publications in law and neuroscience. Data from Law and Neuroscience Bibliography, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience
(http://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography.php).
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that depict the prohibited actions of a protagonist, following
which the subjects are tasked to evaluate and assess the appropri-
ate punishment for these actions (e.g., Buckholtz et al., 2008). By
manipulating factors crucial to determining punishment, in par-
ticular, the severity of the harm caused by the act and the mental
state that the protagonist was in when he committed this act, one
can start parsing the brain mechanisms underlying TPP.
This approach initially highlighted a network of prefrontal,
temporoparietal, and corticolimbic brain regions involved in
TPP decisions (Buckholtz et al., 2008). It then led to the develop-
ment of a neural network model of TPP, in which the temporo-
parietal cortex decodes the action(s) of the protagonist and infers
his mental state, a corticolimbic circuit comprised of the
amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex provides a neural heuris-
tic for the amount of emotional arousal provoked by the harm,
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex integrates this information
to select an appropriate punishment outcome (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012) (Fig. 3).
More recent work has extended these findings and perspec-
tives, providing support for the TPP model by demonstrating
that transcranial magnetic stimulation to the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex disrupts punishment assignment while leaving
blameworthiness evaluation intact (Buckholtz et al., manuscript
in preparation), thereby providing neural evidence for a dissoci-
ation between the process of evaluating blame and assigning the
appropriate punishment. Andother, similar studies not only pro-
vide compelling evidence for the role of emotional arousal in
punishment decisions, they also identify the brain mechanisms
by which the mental state of the defendant can trump the harm
caused by his actions because punishment may be waived alto-
gether when such actions are caused accidentally and without
negligence (Treadway et al., manuscript in preparation).
Notably, these findings generally align with studies of second-
party punishment during simple neuro-economic games (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006). That suggests that the mecha-
nisms by which judges arrive at a punishment decision from an
uninvolved and unbiased perspective are very much the same as
those engaged when we decide to punish those who have done us
wrong directly. Similarly, mounting evidence for the critical role
of the corticolimbic circuit in punishment decision-making
highlights the pivotal functions that emotions serve in this cog-
nitive process. This provides some potentially telling neurobio-
logical counterpoint to the frequent lay assumption that TPP
decisions can be made, and frequently are made, with reason
unclouded by emotion. And these methods provide a framework
to study bias (for example, with the introduction of prior evi-
dence about the character of a defendant), with an eventual goal
of reducing the presence of such biases in legal decision-making.
To be sure, this neurobiological research is typically performed
under conditions that are remote from the court environment, as
well as with participants who have no specific legal expertise. How-
ever, recent work suggests that methods such as these yield findings
that appear to apply also in more legalistic contexts (Schleim et al.,
2011). Consequently, this line of research illustrates the kinds of
contributions that neuroscience can make to our understanding of
how liability and punishment decisions are made.
Ethics in neurolaw
Neuroscience intersects with the law in multiple ways, and the
ethical impact of neuroscience is similarly diverse (Morse, 2006;
Figure 3. A neurocognitive hypothesis for third-party punishment behavior. (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012).
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Farah, 2012). To facilitate thinking clearly about the numerous
ethical issues that arise in neurolaw, two general distinctions are
useful.
The first broad distinction concerns the role of neuroscience
in decisions about criminal responsibility. To be found guilty in
the U.S. legal system, a defendant must not only have performed
a prohibited act, she must also have done so in a legally culpable
state of mind. For example, if Mary suffers an unexpected seizure
while standing on a subway platform and bumps into John, caus-
ing him to tumble to his death beneath thewheels of an oncoming
train, Mary is not guilty of murder. Yet if she purposefully gave
the same bump to John, intending his death by subway car, she
would be.Neuroscience has sometimes been taken to suggest that
the two scenarios are fundamentally the same and that therefore
the legal outcomes should also be the same.
Here is the reasoning: the motives that led Mary to push John
purposefully onto the train tracks are products of her brain,
which was in turn shaped by her genes and her environment,
neither of which she chose. Accordingly, she is nomore “respon-
sible” for her act when she intends it than she is when she has an
uncontrollable seizure.
Of course, no defense attorney has ever faced a jury and ar-
gued “Because of processes set in motion at the time of the Big
Bang, my client could not have acted otherwise, and conse-
quently must be innocent.” We should therefore distinguish this
role for neuroscience in law, casting doubt on the very possibility
of responsibility, from the way in which neuroscience is actually
applied to the determination of responsibility.
Law generally assumes that people are responsible for their
actions. It nonetheless allows some exceptions, through applica-
tion of commonsensical psychological criteria. These include, for
example, assessments of a defendant’s intentions, understanding,
rationality, and self-control at the time of the prohibited act.
Within this framework, neuroscientific evidence is essentially
one more source of evidence regarding these psychological traits
and states. Here are two examples within this responsibility
domain.
One concerns the role of neuroscience in enabling legal deci-
sions about entire groups of people. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently invoked group-based neuroscientific evidence concern-
ing the immaturity of the adolescent brain to help reach group-
wide conclusions about the extent of adolescent liability for
criminal behavior. The neuroscience is relevant because it pro-
vides additional support for understanding immature judgment
and self-control.
The other example concerns the ability of neuroscience to
provide evidence specific to individual defendant. InNew York v.
Herbert Weinstein, a man with no history of mental disorder
killed his wife in a violent rage. Subsequent neuroimaging re-
vealed a large arachnoid cyst compressing his prefrontal cortex.
The defense offered the scan as evidence that he had impaired
self-control, and this reportedly drove a favorable plea bargain.
Here, the neuroscience provided information intended to aug-
ment the legal system’s understanding of theman’s psychological
capacities, and hence his own, individualized responsibility.
A second broad distinction, regarding the ethics of neurolaw,
concerns the role of neuroscience generating ethical issues. In
some cases, ethical challenges arise for reasons not directly related
to neuroscience per se. For example, the ethics of predicting re-
cidivism with neuroimaging depends on factors such as the
method’s accuracy and the consequences of false positives and
negatives. The fact that the prediction is based on information
about the brain is largely irrelevant from an ethical standpoint. In
cases such as these, precedents fromnon-neuroscientific analyses
(such as from other types of predictive testing) can help us to
anticipate ethical problems and to seek solutions.
Other legal applications of neuroscience, in contrast, can raise
novel ethical issues. For example, suppose that a convicted man
were sentenced to a brain intervention instead a behavioral inter-
vention, such as anger management therapy. That would raise
ethical issues not encountered with traditional methods of behavior
change. With behavioral interventions, the offender must typically
choose to use the skills he learned.With brain interventions such as
medication, however, the changes bypass the offender’s decision-
making, arguably infringing on his autonomy at a very different
level.
These two broad roles of neuroscience in law—to deepen psy-
chological knowledge (as in the case of criminal responsibility)
and to generate new but potentially controversial tools (as in the
cases of predicting recidivism or enabling direct brain interven-
tions)—raise important ethical issues with which society and the
legal system will be grappling for some time.
Beyond criminal responsibility: other issues in law
and neuroscience
Most of the scholarly discussion about law and neuroscience has
revolved around questions of responsibility. If neuroscience can
help us connect physical states of the brainwith subjectivemental
states, that should indeed prove useful. However, neuroscience
seems poised to offer lawmuchmore. For example, neuroscience
should improve our predictions of future mental states and con-
sequent behavior, it may help us learn about relevant current
states of mind, it might allow us to intervene more directly in the
brain to treat nondisease behaviors, and it could lead to the de-
velopment of new ways to enhance human mental capabilities.
The law, both directly and indirectly, will be involved in all of
these developments (Greely, 2009).
By providing us with better understandings of the physical
roots of neurological diseases, mental illnesses, and nonpatho-
logical behaviors, neurosciencemay improve our predictions of a
person’s future. In some cases, this might be better understood as
early diagnosis of a disease process, before it shows clear (or any)
symptoms. An example is detection of early effects of Alzheimer
disease, through PET scans for amyloid plaque build-up or from
biomarkers in cerebral spinal fluid. In other cases, such as the
correlation between certain genetic variants and future Alzhei-
mer disease, it may be more purely prediction. In either case,
however, our improved understanding of conditions such as Alz-
heimer disease, schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, and others,
could improve our ability to predict who will and will not be
diagnosedwith the illness. This has clear implications for the legal
system through the legal issues that will arise around employ-
ment, insurance, education, and other benefits that might be
denied, or provided, based on such predictions. (One could also
imagine, for example, possible judicial appointees being asked for
medical evidence of their risks for Alzheimer disease.) As the
sameunderstanding improves early diagnosis, itmaywell have an
even more direct effect on legal proceedings, influencing deci-
sions about a person’s competency to be a witness or to control
his own funds and important life decisions.
Neuroscience-based predictions might also change the legal
system more directly, by improving our ability to predict some-
one’s future violent or criminal behavior. The legal system al-
ready uses such predictions in making decisions regarding bail,
sentencing, parole, the death penalty, and even, in some psychi-
atric and sexual offender contexts, preventive detention. Some-
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times the predictions are subjective. Other times they are clinical.
In still others evidence from social science has been used to create
predictive algorithms. Neuroscience, perhaps through neuroim-
aging of a defendant, may either on its own, or in combination
with existing methods, be able to improve the accuracy of these
predictions (Aharoni et al., 2012).
Neuroscience may also help us ascertain someone’s current
mental state. That could be extremely valuable, for example, in
trying to decide whether a plaintiff actually is experiencing the
disabling pain he claims. Legal systems make millions of these
decisions every year, often with little evidence other than the
claimant’s self-report. Neuroimaging results that correlate
strongly with the presence or absence of subjective pain may
never be perfect. But they may be much better than our current
tools (Kolber, 2007). Similarly, neuroscience might help detect
whether a person recognizes something (Meixner and Rosenfeld,
2011) has a particular emotional response to something, or even,
possibly, whether that person is trying to deceive. Any of these
forms of “mind-reading” could be extremely useful in court, and
sometimes outside of it. And theywill raise, in theUnited States at
least, complicated constitutional issues involving the Fourth
(Farahany, 2012b) and Fifth (Farahany, 2012a) Amendments.
Looking at neuroscientific research in broad context, it’s clear
that the greatest interest in and funding for neuroscience research
is not driven by enthusiasm for applications in prediction or
detection. It is instead being driven by hoped-for interventions.
Wewant treatments that prevent, mitigate, or cure diseases of the
brain. Although useful interventions from neuroscience have
been uncommon so far, it is the hope of them that funds this
research. The key point for law, however, is that, if we succeed in
treating some kinds of disease, the depth of understanding that
requires may also allow the “treatment” of mental states that are
not diseases. Shyness, sexual orientation, religiosity (or its ab-
sence), and political preferences are all traits that some people
may want to change, either in themselves or in others. Whether
direct brain interventions were to be imposed by judges seeking
to “rehabilitate” criminals; by parents seeking to “improve” their
children; or by competent adults seeking to “change their selves,”
the legal and regulatory system will necessarily be involved.
(Greely, 2008).
Finally, neurosciencemay lead to newmethods for enhancing
mental abilities. Controversy has stalked the nonmedical use of
Adderall or Ritalin for their (very unclear) cognitive enhancing
powers. But what if medical research on disease treatments leads
to the creation of drugs or devices with proven effectiveness at
enhancing the healthy? How would we want such enhancements
to be used, in society in general and even in the legal system?
(Think of enhancing witnesses’ memories or helping students
pass the bar examination) (Greely et al., 2008).
In all of these applications of neuroscience, and more, the law
will necessarily be involved. In some, it will be called upon to set,
interpret, and enforce the limits of actions made possible by neu-
roscience. In others, neuroscience will affect the law’s own pro-
cesses, from the courtroom to the corporate lawyer’s office to
issues of judicial appointment. One way or the other, law and
neuroscience will be increasingly bound together on questions
that go far beyond responsibility.
Conclusions
As discussed above, there are a wide variety of contexts in which
neuroscience might aid the legal system substantially. We believe
there are ample reasons for optimism. But, in light of many at-
tendant challenges, we of course counsel caution as well. There
are inherent limitations in the current states of neuroscientific
knowledge. And there are difficult, although not insurmount-
able, challenges in communicating across the law/neuroscience
disciplinary divide, as well as in carefully and properly interpret-
ing neuroscientific evidence within the specific legal contexts in
which it is offered (Jones et al., 2013b). Not surprisingly, the
intersections of law and neuroscience have prompted some de-
bate over whether we will in fact see, at the frontier edges of this
new discipline, a net gain in the fair and effective administration
of justice, and inwhat specific contexts (Greene andCohen, 2004;
Sapolsky, 2004; Morse, 2006, 2010, 2011; Patel et al., 2007;
Pustilnik, 2009; Brown and Murphy, 2010; Hughes, 2010; May-
berg, 2010; Morse, 2010, 2011; Pardo and Patterson, 2010;
Legrenzi et al., 2011; Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013). But in our view,
one thing is utterly clear. The extent to which the legal system can
avail itself of the best neuroscience has to offer, and can also best
avoid misrepresentations or misinterpretations of neuroscien-
tific evidence, will depend in part on the extent and quality of the
engagement of neuroscientists with the myriad researchable is-
sues that already exist within the arena (Jones et al., 2013b), as
well as with the many new issues that will inevitably arise, only
some of which can currently be foreseen.
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